In this paper we consider the linear-quadratic dierential game with an innite planning horizon. We derive both necessary and sucient conditions for existence of open-loop Nash equilibria for this game. Furthermore we show h o w all equilibria can be easily obtained from the eigenspace structure of a Hamiltonian matrix that is associated with the game.
Introduction
The last decade there has been an increasing interest to study several problems in economics using a dynamic game theoretical setting. In particular in the area of environmental economics and macro-economic policy coordination this is a very natural framework to model problems (see e.g. de Zeeuw et al. (1991 Zeeuw et al. ( ), M aler (1992 , Kaitala et al. (1992) and Dockner et al. (1985) , Tabellini (1986) , Fershtman et al. (1987) , Petit (1989) , Levine et al. (1994) , van Aarle et al. (1995) , Douven et al (1995) ). In, e.g., policy coordination problems usually two basic questions arise i.e., rst, are policies coordinated and, second, which information do the participating parties have. Usually both these points are rather unclear and, therefore, strategies for dierent possible scenarios are calculated and compared with eachother. One of these scenarios is the so-called open-loop strategy. This scenario can be interpreted as that the parties simultaneously determine their strategy, next submit their strategies to some authority who then enforces these plans as binding commitments. So, this strategy is based on the assumption that the parties act non-cooperatively and that the only information they have on the model is its present state and the model structure. Obviously, since according this scenario the participating parties can not react to eachother's policies, its economic relevance is mostly rather limited. However, as a benchmark to see how m uch parties can gain by playing other strategies, it plays a fundamental role. Due to its analytic tractability the openloop Nash equilibrium strategy is in particular very popular for problems where the underlying model can be described by a (set of) linear dierential equation(s) and the individual objectives the parties are striving for can be approximated by functions which quadratically penalize deviations from some (equilibrium) targets. Under the assumption that the parties only have a nite-planning horizon, this problem was rst modeled and solved in a mathematically rigorous way b y Starr and Ho in (1969) (see also Lukes et al (1971) , Eisele (1982) and Engwerda (1996) for extensions and more precise formulations). In Abou-Kandil et al. (1993) , Weeren (1995) and Engwerda (1996) also convergence of this equilibrium strategy was studied if the planning horizon expands. Like in the optimal linear quadratic regulator theory it turns out that under some conditions it can be shown that this strategy converges. Furthermore, this converged solution is rather easy to calculate and much easier to implement than the nite planning horizon equilibrium solution. So, the question arises whether this (converged) solution also solves the game if the parties consider an inniteplanning horizon. In Engwerda (1996) this problem was partly solved. That is, on the one hand a sucient condition was given under which open-loop Nash equilibria exist and, on the other hand, for stable systems both a necessary and sucient existence condition was derived. In this paper we will extend this approach. We will show that the condition derived in the above mentioned paper is also necessary and sucient for the general case. We will conclude this paper by a discussion on the consequences of this result for numerical calculation of equilibrium solutions and by considering some special cases when (generically) a unique equilibrium exists.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two w e start by stating the problem analysed in this paper and present some preliminary properties. Section three contains the basic result, whereas section four contains the concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
In this paper we consider the problem where two parties (henceforth called players) try to minimize their individual quadratic performance criterion. Each player controls a dierent set of inputs to a single system, described by a dierential equation of arbitrary order. As already mentioned in the introduction we assume that both players have to formulate their strategy already at the moment the system starts to evolve and this strategy can not be changed once the system runs. So, the players have t o minimize their performance criterion based on the information that they only know the dierential equation and its initial state. We are looking now for combinations of pairs of strategies of both players which are secure against any attempt by one player to unilaterally alter his strategy. That is, for those pairs of strategies which are such that if one player deviates from his strategy he will only lose. In the literature on dynamic games this problem is well-known as the open-loop Nash non-zerosum linear quadratic dierential game (see e.g. Starr and Ho (1969) , Simaan and Cruz (1973) , Ba sar and Olsder (1982) or Abou-Kandil and Bertrand (1986) ). Formally the system we consider is as follows: _ x = Ax + B 1 u 1 + B 2 u 2 ; x (0) = x 0 ;
(1) where x is the n-dimensional state of the system, u i is an m i -dimensional (control) vector player i can manipulate, x 0 is the initial state of the system, A; B 1 , and B 2 are constant matrices of appropriate dimensions, and _ x denotes the time derivative o f x . The performance criterium player i = 1 ; 2 aims to minimize is: lim tf!1 J i (u 1 ; u 2 ) ; where
and J 2 (u 1 ; u 2 ) : = 1 2
in which matrix R ii is positive denite, Q i is semi-positive denite and additionally is positive denite w.r.t. the controllability subspace < A ; B i >; i = 1 ; 2. Note that usually in literature each player's performance criterium also includes a cross term, penalizing the control eorts of the other player. (t) . Elementary calculation shows that x v+w (t) = x v + w ( t ) (1 ) R t 0 e At (B 1 B 2 )w()d. So, using the above result, it is clear that x v+w (t) is square integrable. Moreover, since both v and v + w are square integrable it follows that w has to be square integrable too. From this follows then immediately that also v + w is square integrable. Combining both results gives then that lim tf!1 J i (v + w) < 1; i = 1 ; 2 : Which implies that v + w 2 U . 2 Next, we i n troduce the set of coupled algebraic asymmetric Riccati-type equations associated with this problem:
where S i = B i R 1 ii B T i ; i = 1 ; 2 : W e will see in the next section that the solutions K 1 ; K 2 to this set of equations, that satisfy an additional stability property, play a similar role like the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation in the standard LQ regulator problem. " " This part was proved by Engwerda (1996) , theorem 12.
" " T o prove this part we use the variational approach (see e.g. Friedman (1971) , Lukes and Russell (1971) and Engwerda (1996) ). Suppose that u 1 ; u 2 are a Nash solution. That is, J 1 (u 1 ; u 2 ) J 1 ( u 1 ; u 2 ) and J 2 ( u 1 ; u 2 ) J 2 ( u 1 ; u 2 ): , respectively. Then it is easily veried that (see also proof of lemma 1) x u+w (t) = x u ( t ) + g(t); (6) where g(t) : = R t 0 e A t s B 1 w ( s ) ds is a square integrable function. So, J 1 () can be rewritten as: 1 2
where f(t; ) : = ( x u ( t ) + g(t)) T Q 1 (x u (t) + g(t))+ ( u 1 (t) + w(t)) T R 11 ( u 1 (t) + w(t)):
Note that f(t; ) is dierentiable w.r.t. for every t 2 (0; 1). Simple calculations show that @f @ = 2 ( g T ( t ) Q 1 g ( t ) + w T ( t ) R 11 w(t))+ 2(g T (t)Q 1 x u (t) + w T ( t ) R 11 u 1 (t)) Using the facts that g(t); w ( t ) and u 1 (t) are square integrable, it is obvious now that @f @ is integrable for, e.g., all 2 [ 1; 1]. Using standard arguments we h a v e then that J 1 () is dierentiable on ( 1; 1) and that dJ 1 () d = Z 1 0 f(g T (t)Q 1 g(t) + w T ( t ) R 11 w(t))+ (g T (t)Q 1 x u (t) + w T ( t ) R 11 u 1 (t))gdt From (5) we get dJ 1 ()
So, we get:
Substitution of the expression for g(t) i n to this equation and then interchanging the order of integration yields: u 1 (t))]e t e i , i=1,..,n, where is an arbitrary real number larger than the spectral radius of matrix A and e i is the i-th standard basis vector in IR n . Then it is clear that for every choice of w(t), u 1 + w(t) 2 U . Consequently it follows that u 1 (t) = R Remarks: Parts of the above proof can be substituted by using the results of Haurie et al. (1984, lemma 5.1) . This requires, however, the introduction of the concept of weak overtaking optimality. In this framework it is not required that the state or the performance criterium converge (see Halkin (1974) ). Since we like to stay in the framework of bounded performance criteria, we c hoose to give an elementary selfcontained proof of the theorem. Note that in case the system is not stabilizable, the problem has no solution.
In the above theorem the costs for the individual players are expressed as an integral. In fact, analogously to the optimal LQ regulator theory, w e h a v e that the costs can be obtained indirectly by solving the following associated Lyapunov equations 1 
Proof:
Let M i 0 be the unique solution of (11). Then, using I like to thank Arie Weeren for pointing out this to me the notation x(t) : = e A clt x 0 , w e h a v e
x(t) T M i x(t) = x T 0 M i x 0 ; which proves the claim. 2 4 The solutions for the algebraic Riccati equation
In the previous section we s a w that we can nd all equilibrium solutions by determining all solutions K 1 ; K 2 of the set of algebraic Riccati equations (ARE), which satisfy the additional property that all eigenvalues of the corresponding matrix A S 1 K 1 S 2 K 2 lie in the left half complex plane. MacFarlane (1963) and Potter (1966) independently discovered that there exists a relationship between the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation and the eigenvectors of a related Hamiltonian matrix in linear quadratic regulator problems. Abou-Kandil et al. (1993) already pointed out the existence of a similar relationship for our problem. One of their results was that if the planning horizon t f in (1) tends to innity, under some technical conditions, the solution of the nite planning horizon problem converges to a solution which requires the calculation of a solution K 1 ; K 2 of (ARE) which can be calculated from the eigenspaces of the matrix
In Engwerda et al. (1995) this relationship between solutions of (ARE) and eigenspaces of matrix M was elab- From this result we rst of all observe that every element of K pos denes exactly one solution of (ARE). Furthermore, this set contains only a nite number of elements if and only if the geometric multiplicities of all eigenvalues of M is one (see e.g. Lancaster and Tismenetsky (1985) ). So, in that case we immediately conclude that (ARE) will have at most a nite number of solutions. Furthermore, we see that By considering the eigenvalues and corresponding eigenspaces of matrix M, i t w as shown that (ARE) has 7 solutions K 1 ; K 2 satisfying the stabilization property. So, according to theorem 2, for this choice of matrices, the innite planning horizon game has 7 open-loop Nash equilibria. 2
Concluding remarks
In this paper we considered the existence of open-loop Nash equilibrium solutions in the two-player inniteplanning horizon linear quadratic game. We derived both necessary and sucient conditions for existence of such equilibria. Furthermore we showed how these equilibria can be calculated from the invariant subspaces of the Hamiltonian matrix associated with this game M = 0 @ A S1 S2 Q1 A T 0 Q2 0 A T 1 A . It turns out that the eigenvalues of the closed-loop system, if the open-loop control strategies are implemented in (1), can be obtained from the eigenvalues of this matrix. As was illustrated in an example, in general the game will have more than one equilibrium. An important o p e n problem remains the study of the eigenstructure of this matrix M. One property, which w as already noted in Engwerda (1996) , is that if a discounting factor is included in the performance function that is large enough, matrix M will have n stable eigenvalues. So, in that case there exists at most one equilibrium. Since generically the corresponding eigenvectors will be such that they together form an element o f K pos , w e get generically a unique equilibrium in the discounted case. Moreover, combining the results on scalar systems from Engwerda (1996) and the results of theorem 2, we h a v e that for scalar systems there exists always a unique equilibrium. Finally we note that the obtained results can be straightforwardly generalized to the N player game. Given the results presented here, one might w onder whether we can exploit some of them to get results for the linear quadratic feedback Nash game. At a rst glance this seems, however, not the case. This, since the corresponding Hamiltonian matrix M depends on the solutions of the corresponding algebraic Riccati equations (see e.g. Weeren (1995) ). In Weeren et al. (1994) a sufcient condition can be found for existence of a feedback Nash equilibrium in linear stationary strategies for this dierential game over an innite planning horizon. Moreover, this paper contains a thorough dynamical analysis for the scalar case. For more references and results on this subject we refer to Ba sar and Olsder (1995) , Weeren (1995) and the quoted references in both these references.
